I’m always pretty geeked whenever I get to post something with the folks over at the Afghan Analysts Network. Two reasons: a) it’s a bit of a shift from the usual tone of the blog here, and b) they’ve got some amazing depth of experience when it comes to Afghanistan. I’m getting caught up on the blogging post-vacation here…lots to unpack from when I was out on vacation with what’s been happening in Afghanistan over the last few weeks.
I’ll be covering some of my thoughts on the retrograde, the “zero option,” and why the US doesn’t really need Afghanistan anymore. If indeed the US needed the country in the first place. I die a little inside seeing that in actual print, but the fact is that US security interests are shifting, and Afghanistan runs a very real risk of being left behind.
Nowhere is this more evident then in the case of the Afghan Air Force (AAF), which the US and its other defense partners are still spinning as a win for the overall effort here. And…well, it’s not. From the post:
The coalition has exaggerated the current capabilities of the Afghan air force. Simultaneously, it reduced its own air support and failed to prepare the Afghan security forces in time for the withdrawal of coalition air assets. This is creating a potentially fatal capability gap that the Afghan air force is currently unable to fill. Even more troubling is the fact that this gap will probably remain until well into 2015 and beyond, when the Afghan air force is expected to receive the first of a fleet of Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft (see report here), courtesy of the United States.
All of which shouldn’t be terribly surprising to regular readers of the blog. Worth the read, anyway, though. Since, well, it’s my blog. So I’m partial, y’all.
Meanwhile, you stay on that sunny side, folks!
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